More than half of Georgians correctly identify Russia as a major source of disinformation[¹]. Yet significant minorities still believe demonstrably false claims about EU policies and Georgia’s international standing. This paradox reveals both the challenge and opportunity facing Georgia’s struggle for democratic governance.
In the current context of authoritarian consolidation, independent counter-disinformation efforts face systematic obstruction. The ruling party has adopted Russian propaganda techniques — from “Global War Party” rhetoric to conspiracy theories about Western threats — making the information environment itself a tool of democratic backsliding[²]. Civil society organizations working to build media literacy and expose disinformation operate under increasing pressure, their efforts constrained by shrinking civic space and hostile government rhetoric.
Yet this analysis looks beyond the present crisis. When Georgia eventually restores democratic governance — through sustained civic resistance and institutional reform — the country will need sophisticated strategies to rebuild information resilience and counter years of accumulated propaganda. The evidence presented here suggests that post-authoritarian Georgia cannot simply return to earlier approaches. The information landscape is fragmenting, divided into distinct ecosystems that require different responses.
Understanding these ecosystems now — how different segments of Georgian society consume information and respond to disinformation — prepares the groundwork for more effective future interventions. Whether combating current regime propaganda or building democratic resilience afterward, the fundamental challenge remains: Georgian audiences are not uniform, and treating them as such limits the impact of counter-propaganda efforts.
Georgian civil society has been at the forefront of countering Russian disinformation for over a decade. Following the 2008 war, when Russia’s information offensive proved devastatingly effective[³], NGOs mobilized to build resilience against propaganda. Organizations documented disinformation campaigns, conducted media literacy training, and developed fact-checking initiatives. As researchers Jaba Devdariani and Zviad Adzinbaia documented, these efforts represented a crucial “first line of defense” when state institutions proved either unwilling or unable to address the problem systematically[⁴].
Yet these valuable initiatives shared a common assumption: that Georgian audiences could be addressed as a unified public. Media literacy workshops taught the same critical thinking skills to diverse participants. Fact-checking organizations debunked false narratives using identical messaging across platforms. Counter-narrative campaigns crafted universal appeals to Georgian patriotism and European values.
This approach reflected both resource constraints and a democratic ideal — that truth, properly presented, would resonate equally with all citizens. But it overlooked a fundamental reality: Georgians don’t inhabit a single information space. A 70-year-old in rural Samtskhe-Javakheti watching evening news and a 25-year-old Tbilisi resident scrolling through Facebook exist in fundamentally different information worlds. The same counter-narrative that might resonate with one could fail to reach — or even alienate — the other.
Survey data reveals just how different these worlds are, and why this matters for counter-propaganda efforts[⁵].
Who Gets Their News Where — and What They Believe
Analysis of a nationally representative survey revealed three distinct information ecosystems in Georgia, each characterized by different demographics, media consumption patterns, and responses to disinformation.
### Georgia's Three Information Ecosystems
**DIGITAL NATIVES (41% of population)**
- Typical age: 18-34 (46%) and 35-54 (47%)
- Primary news source: Social media (82%)
- News frequency: Active daily consumers
- Tbilisi residence: High (43%)
- Georgian Dream support: Low (17%)
- Believe "EU revoked status" (false): 25.7%
- Identify Russia as disinfo source: 54.3%
**NEWS AVOIDERS (11% of population)**
- Typical age: Mixed, younger-leaning
- Primary news source: None - never follow news
- News frequency: Never (100%)
- Tbilisi residence: Average (33%)
- Georgian Dream support: Low (14%)
- Believe "EU revoked status" (false): 21.7%
- Identify Russia as disinfo source: 31.7%
**TRADITIONAL CONSUMERS (47% of population)**
- Typical age: 55+ (71%)
- Primary news source: News websites/apps (84%)
- News frequency: Active daily consumers
- Tbilisi residence: Low (27%)
- Georgian Dream support: High (34%)
- Believe "EU revoked status" (false): 18.5%
- Identify Russia as disinfo source: 56.1%
The data reveals a paradox at the heart of Georgia’s information landscape. On one hand, specific false claims spread differently in different communities. Young social media users proved most susceptible to the false claim that “EU revoked Georgia’s candidate status” — a recent narrative that spread rapidly on digital platforms. Meanwhile, complete avoidance of news left citizens unable to identify disinformation sources, with only 32% recognizing Russia’s role compared to over 54% in other groups.
Yet simultaneously, certain patterns transcend these boundaries. Most strikingly, digital natives and traditional consumers — despite vast differences in age (young vs. elderly), location (urban vs. regional), platform (social media vs. news sites), and politics (opposition-leaning vs. pro-government) — showed nearly identical rates of correctly identifying Russia as a disinformation source (54% and 56%). This suggests that some truths about Russian interference have achieved broad recognition across Georgian society, regardless of how people consume information.
This dual reality — different vulnerabilities to specific narratives combined with shared awareness of certain facts — demands a more sophisticated counter-propaganda strategy than simply broadcasting uniform messages or assuming complete separation between groups.
This evidence presents Georgian civil society with two interconnected challenges that cannot be addressed through traditional approaches.
Challenge One: Different communities require tailored interventions. A counter-narrative strategy optimized for Facebook-scrolling youth in Tbilisi will never reach the 11% of Georgians who avoid news entirely, nor will it resonate with older citizens consuming traditional news websites. The 25-year-old social media user susceptible to viral claims about EU policy needs different messaging than the news-avoidant citizen who lacks basic frameworks for identifying disinformation sources. Civil society organizations operating with limited resources have understandably defaulted to uniform messaging, but this approach leaves entire segments unreached or unconvinced.
Challenge Two: The scale exceeds civil society capacity. When 18–26% of Georgians — spanning all age groups, regions, and media consumption patterns — believe demonstrably false narratives, we’re observing a widespread problem. NGO workshops reaching thousands cannot address vulnerabilities affecting hundreds of thousands. The fact that even politically opposed groups (opposition-leaning youth and pro-government elderly) show similar recognition of Russian disinformation sources, yet remain vulnerable to specific false claims, suggests the issue isn’t simply partisan bias but rather gaps in critical evaluation skills that permeate society.
These findings point toward the need for both immediate tactical adaptation — tailoring counter-narratives to specific audiences — and longer-term institutional responses that build societal resilience at scale.
International experience in countering disinformation offers proven approaches that Georgia could adapt, combining immediate tactical shifts with long-term institutional reform.
Different messages for different audiences. Finland’s strategic communication approach recognizes that a grandmother in rural Lapland and a Helsinki startup worker consume information completely differently. Rather than broadcasting one message everywhere, Finnish authorities develop tailored content for specific demographics and platforms. When combating Russian disinformation about NATO membership, they created different materials: fact-based briefings for traditional media consumers, visual social media content for younger audiences, and community discussions for isolated regions[⁶]. This segmentation directly addresses the ecosystem challenge revealed in Georgian data.
Inoculation before infection. Recent research across Europe and the United States shows that “prebunking” — exposing people to weakened forms of manipulation techniques before they encounter real disinformation — works better than debunking false claims after they spread[⁷]. Google’s Jigsaw team developed short video “inoculations” that teach people to recognize emotional manipulation, scapegoating, and false dichotomies. Shown these videos, people became significantly more resistant to later disinformation. Ukraine adapted this approach in 2022, creating entertaining content that taught citizens to spot manipulation techniques without requiring them to attend workshops or read lengthy fact-checks.
Trusted voices over official sources. Taiwan’s success against Chinese disinformation campaigns relies heavily on activating diverse messengers rather than government spokespersons. Humor creators, local influencers, and community leaders reach audiences that ignore official channels. The Taiwanese government works with civic tech communities to rapidly create shareable, often funny content that exposes false narratives[⁸]. For Georgia’s 11% who avoid news entirely, traditional fact-checking websites are irrelevant — messages must come through the few channels they do engage: family, friends, entertainment, and community spaces.
Building skills in schools, not just workshops. Estonia responded to Russian disinformation by embedding media literacy throughout its education system — not as standalone classes but woven into history, civics, and language instruction from elementary school onward[⁹]. Students learn to evaluate sources while studying historical events, identify manipulation while analyzing literature, and verify claims while doing science projects. Similarly, Taiwan now mandates media literacy education starting in primary school. Both countries recognized that NGO initiatives alone cannot reach entire populations — only systematic education reform can build foundational critical thinking skills at scale.
Coordination instead of duplication. Multiple European countries have established strategic communication task forces that bring together government agencies, civil society organizations, media outlets, and technology platforms under unified frameworks while allowing tailored implementation[¹⁰]. This prevents different groups from contradicting each other or duplicating efforts. The European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, for example, coordinates counter-disinformation across dozens of organizations while respecting their independence and expertise.
Shared values, plural expressions. Effective counter-narratives articulate principles that unite diverse audiences — sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic aspirations — while allowing different communities to interpret these through their own cultural and generational perspectives. Lithuania’s approach to countering Russian propaganda emphasizes national independence and resistance to foreign manipulation, themes that resonate across political divides, while allowing both conservative and progressive citizens to understand these principles through their own values[¹¹]. This respects diversity while maintaining unified opposition to foreign manipulation.
Understanding how different Georgians get their news is the first step toward actually stopping disinformation. Civil society groups have done important work for over a decade, but research shows why the same message for everyone doesn’t work: a false claim spreads differently on Facebook than on news websites, and people who avoid news altogether won’t see any counter-message at all.
Moving forward means doing two things at once: right now, crafting different messages for different audiences and finding trusted voices in each community; long-term, building media literacy into schools and getting everyone — government, NGOs, journalists, tech companies — working together instead of separately.
Other countries facing similar threats have figured this out. Georgia can too — but only by moving beyond one-size-fits-all approaches to meet people where they actually are.
[1] CRRC Georgia, “Survey on Information Disorder and Attitudes” (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2025), https://www.caucasusbarometer.org/en/sida2025/codebook/
[2] Davit Kutidze, “Government of Georgia’s Public Rhetoric — Minuscule Model of Russian Propaganda,” Central European Journal of Communication 2, no. 34 (Fall 2023): 224–242.
[3] Paul A. Goble, “Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War Between Russia and Georgia,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, ed. Svante E. Cornell and Frederick Starr (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015), 181–195.
[4] Jaba Devdariani and Zviad Adzinbaia, “Responding to Russian Disinformation: A Case of Georgia” (Tbilisi: PMC Research Center, 2018), https://www.pmcresearch.org/policypapers_file/f6ac5dfb34c12e31c.pdf
[5] CRRC Georgia, “Survey on Information Disorder and Attitudes” (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2025), https://www.caucasusbarometer.org/en/sida2025/codebook/
[6] Finnish Government, “Countering Hybrid Threats,” Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2017.
[7] Jon Roozenbeek and Sander van der Linden, “Breaking Harmony Square: A game that ‘inoculates’ against political misinformation,” The Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, 2020.
[8] Audrey Tang, “How Digital Innovation Can Fight Pandemics and Strengthen Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (2020): 133–139.
[9] Kristi Jõesaar and Kristina Reinsalu, “Media Literacy in the Estonian Education System,” in Media Literacy in the Information Age, ed. Divina Frau-Meigs et al. (Moscow: ICO “Information for All,” 2013).
[10] European External Action Service, “Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force,” EEAS, 2021.
[11] Margarita Šešelgytė, “Lithuania’s Strategic Communication: Deterring Russian Disinformation,” in Strategic Communications and National Security, ed. James Farwell (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2020).
