Reading between the Lines

By Zaza Bibilashvili
August 8, 2012
Tabula Magazine

The August 2 edition of Wall Street Journal Europe featured a doctrinal article by Bidzina Ivanishvili with a slightly confusing title – How I’d Build Peace in the Caucasus.  It was confusing, because the letter says almost nothing about the Caucasus, except for couple of ambiguous hints on the possibility of violence in the region and unclear, though not the first, analogy with Syria.

Such letters are not written exclusively by one person and we may assume that not only Mr. Ivanishvili, but the entire “Georgian Dream” took part in drafting of the letter, with its local as well as foreign intellectual resources.  Therefore, this letter may be considered as a cornerstone of this political force, a document containing its views on main foreign policy issues.

On its face, this article constitutes an attempt to eliminate suspicions that “Georgian Dream” is in fact a Russian project. Yet, the real effect of the article is the opposite. The only practical result of this article may be granting legitimacy to a number of Russian clichés by articulating them from a Georgian source.

While it is impossible to assert that Mr. Ivanishvili is acting on someone’s orders (no evidence has been provided to this end so far), it is likewise impossible not to notice that the rhetoric and views of Mr. Ivanishvili are identical to Kremlin’s, except for the mandatory part where he is constrained by the name of a “Georgian Politician” and the already recognized international legal status quo.  The author practically reiterates all Russian clichés intended for uninformed public. Upon reading the article, a Russian politician could easily say to his European colleagues – “Is this also me?!”. In response, French or German officials, to whom the article may read as a promise that Europe would be relieved of the discomfort of being constantly reminded of the Georgian issue, could now in good conscience justify their apathy towards the Caucasus.

Here are several examples, out of many:

Russian Cliché  No.1

Mr. Ivanishvili notes that “tensions are growing in a region that is confronting 21st-century challenges with 19th-century institutions, all grounded in 16th-century hatreds.” That Georgia faces historically-rooted ethnic conflicts, as opposed to interstate political conflicts is an official Russian version, which the Russian Foreign Ministry has unsuccessfully been trying to spread. This is the version that not only contradicts common sense, but at the same time destroys any theoretical chance of restoration of Georgian territorial integrity. According to this version, the Caucasus is a region which is stuck in medieval mentality and Russia is the only force able to control it without “bothering” the civilized world. Until now, this idea was promoted by Russia only. Isn’t it more effective if this view is now heard from a Georgian source?

Russian Cliché No.2

“If elected, my Georgian Dream coalition will drop Cold War rhetoric and do a better job of defusing the real causes of the explosive situation in our region.” Unfortunately, Mr. Ivanishvili avoids this critical issue and fails to clarify what exactly “real causes” of the “explosive situation in the region” are. Could it be only the rhetoric and “style” (especially bilateral?!) that he goes on to discuss further? Since the article is written by a Georgian politician, one should assume that “defusing the real causes of the explosive situation” is something Georgia is able to, but does not do. That is a Russian Cliché No. 2: There would be no conflict, if only Georgia “behaved.”

Russian Cliché No.3

“We will abandon saber-rattling and recognize that Georgia is a small regional power in a very dangerous neighborhood. No sustainable future can be built by projecting our own military power against Russia or anywhere else.” The reader will definitely think that until now this is what has been happening – Georgia has been using its “military power” against Russia or has been threatening to use it. Sounds familiar?

It is strange that in light of such seemingly pacifist rhetoric, the author keeps raising the threat of internal violence as one of the possible developments. “Without hope for freedom and liberty, our society will eventually explode with internal strife.” This means that according to the author, not only is Georgia currently devoid of freedom, but there is no hope of freedom either. It seems like the author is preparing the readers that instability (which, according to many, is Mr. Ivanishvili’s real goal), shall be triggered by citizens’ deprivation of freedom and may start spontaneously.

Russian Cliché No.4

“If we were to become a Caucasian Cuba, our hopes of joining the West would be dashed forever.” Cuba’s role in the Cold War is universally known.  Is such analogy adequate in the reality of the 21st century? Who would perceive Georgia’s pro-NATO aspirations as an attempt to turn Georgia into Cuba, if not a Russian politician stuck in the mentality of the 19th century? How credible is it that such comparisons are coming from a Georgian politician of modern mentality, planning to build a democracy the quality of which, according to the author, will surprise Europe?

Another quote from the same opera: “Some observers outside Georgia seem to prefer the military stand-off they know to the uncertainty of democratic dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi.” According to Mr. Ivanishvili, it follows that democratic dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi is a possibility, but this is prevented by some observers outside Georgia. The message is clear – “leave Georgia and Russia alone and they will take care of their own business.” It is one thing to hear such statements from an eccentric Russian politician. But it is another thing to hear this from an influential Georgian politician. Could Mr. Ivanishvili give us at least one example of a successful one-on-one dialogue between Russia and any of its smaller neighbors? …It’s a pity indeed, that there is no introductory course in world history for those planning to go into politics.

Russian Cliché No.5

“The conflict emerged from the xenophobic and confrontational style that is endemic to both governments. If we can agree that we both made mistakes, we will already have made some progress.“ We could ignore this naïve, almost comic conclusion based on the author’s ignorance of facts and history, but the temptation to ask the question is too strong – could Mr. Ivanishvili clarify why the Russian course and relations with Georgia remain unchanged irrespective of the rhetoric and style of various Georgian governments? How could he explain the identical Tzarist, Bolshevic and post-soviet approach of Russia to the completely different governments of Georgia? Russia was similarly ruthless during the times of loyal “Menshevics” and rule of Shevardnadze, as well as more hawkish Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili. If the existence of a conflict is caused by “style” only, what is the style what will be acceptable to Russia and not detrimental to Georgia?  

It is hard to believe that a serious politician would propose to settle relations with Russia on the basis of change in rhetoric and style, even to the averagely informed observers. However, let us follow this logic and suppose that the Georgian government does change the rhetoric. What interest will Russia have in taking reciprocal steps? What happens when Russia does not change anything (which is highly likely, because Russia has never behaved in any other way and we have no grounds to suppose otherwise)? What shall be the next step of Ivanishvili? What shall he offer to Russia in return for change in rhetoric and in reality at what expense is “Georgian Dream” planning to settle controversies with Russia?

“To those who claim that our new style [again the “style!”] is part of a Russian plot to weaken Georgia's resolve, I direct their attention to conflicts raging in other parts of the world.” When reading this sentence, we get the impression that there is an editorial mistake in the text, because it is difficult to understand the meaning of the text and determine in what way shifting attention to conflicts around the world may answer a question posed by Mr. Ivanishvili himself. However, in this sense, this sentence is no different from any other:

Let’s take another – “For long-term models of resolving historic enmities, we will draw on experiences in South Africa, on the dialogue between Poland and Russia, and above all on the European Union itself. We will also explore the German experience with democracy-building through development aid.” What does South African experience have to do with Georgian-Russian conflict? Which Russian-Polish dialogue is he talking about? Let us for a second forget the first or the second Katyn tragedies, but how can one forget that Poland was able to engage in a successful dialogue with Russia only after it became a member of the NATO and the EU? It is likewise unclear where the German example fits into picture, or exactly which example Mr. Ivanishvili means.

Conclusion

According to the article, the problem for the author an ethnic strife rooted in the Middle Ages, and he plans to solve the conflict with Russia by softening the rhetoric and changing the “style”. Taking all of this into consideration, we may pose the final question, as follows: Mr. Ivanishvili is: (a) Honest, but naïve; (b) Politically inexperienced; (c) (a) and (b) together; (d) One who promotes Russian policy goals, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

As a Georgian citizen, I can only hope that the answer is (c), which leaves the possibility that after having gained a better understanding of the relevant issues, Mr. Ivanishvili will revisit his position in relation to this very important topic for the country. And if this happens, let the MPs of UNM and GD argue on current social-economic and philosophical-esthetic issues all they want, within the framework of a routine democratic process.

http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/61021-striqonebs-shoris-gazhonili-azrebi